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Political Masculinities and Populism 
Politics is most often conceived of as a gender-neutral practice guided by rationality. 
Yet, as is the case more generally in society, masculinity operates as a hidden (human) 
norm structuring politics. As the ‘unmarked’ gender category, its influence has 
remained hidden from critical enquiry. However, since the early 1990s, a growing body 
of literature in masculinity studies generally, and masculinities in politics in particular, 
has debunked the myth of the gender-neutrality of politics and made masculinity visible 
(see Starck & Sauer, 2014). 
As is the case in masculinity studies, right-wing populist discourse currently 
refutes the rational and gender-neutral image of politics. Yet unlike masculinity studies, 
masculinity is not open to critical enquiry among right-wing populists. Rather, populist 
politicians such as Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin promote and valorise the 
relationship between masculinity and politics (Boatright & Sperling, 2020; Sperling, 
2015). Newly emerging versions of right-wing populism have been described as being 
misogynist and sexist: they oppose feminism and gender-equality measures, same-sex 
marriage and gender studies; they seek to re-instantiate traditional family and associated 
gender roles; and they pursue a strong-man style of political leadership (Dietze, 2018, p. 
34; Inglehart & Norris, 2016, p. 7; Korolczuk & Graff, 2018; Mayer, Ajanovic & Sauer, 
2018; Mayer, Sori & Sauer, 2016; Nocorel, 2013, p. 5). At the same time, somewhat 
paradoxically, the seeming ‘gender traditionalism’ of populism (Sauer et al., 2016) is 
undercut by the existence of female leaders of populist parties and populists’ appeals to 
European values of gender-equality and emancipation (Akkerman, 2015; Dietze, 2018; 
Mayer, Ajanovic & Sauer 2014).  
This special issue contributes to the debate on gender and populism by focusing 
on the relationship between the concepts of political masculinities and populism. It 
 
 
developed from a conference on Political Masculinities and Populism, hosted by the 
Political Masculinities Network in December 2017, and based at the University of 
Koblenz-Landau. The research network was established in 2012. It aimed to bring 
scholars together, from different disciplines, who hold a common interest in the political 
dimensions of masculinities. The Political Masculinities Network merged with the 
Uppsala network on Men in Politics in 2018. This research network is committed to 
critical research on political masculinities and seeks to encourage a broad church of 
cross-, inter- and multi-disciplinary debate with the aim of comparing, contrasting, and 
where possible integrating different modes of understanding and related findings from 
across academic disciplines. The special issue contributes toward this project. We 
provide a brief overview to this topic in this introductory paper. 
The concept of populism 
Populism is a contested concept (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 2). It is 
frequently used in media and political debate but difficult to define as an analytical 
concept. The term refers to different and conflicting political groups and projects. 
Whilst in Europe it is most often associated with the (radical) political right, the United 
States have a tradition of “liberal populism”, an expression, which in Europe would be 
“a blatant contradiction” (Müller, 2016, p. 9). Populism has also been linked with left-
wing politics, especially in South American and southern European countries (Mudde & 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015), whereas some populist movements are best described as 
hybrid in combining elements of left and right (Brubaker, 2017, p. 358f.). Moreover, 
their social basis may be agrarian or urban; their economic policies protectionist and 
state-centred or neoliberal and market-centred; they may be secular or religious; and 
they may celebrate cultural liberalism or attack it. Populist politicians may be 
challengers or incumbents seeking to mobilize or demobilize. Consequently, scholars 
 
 
from different backgrounds use the term to describe different phenomena, which in turn 
have inspired different analytical approaches. For instance, the study of populism in 
Latin America focuses predominantly on economic and organizational aspects of 
populism, while European scholars use to stress the political and ideological aspects 
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 17f.) 
In seeking to define the concept of populism, the only common basis for doing 
so is that all populist movements, parties, figures, and regimes claim to speak in the 
name of ‘the people’ against various ‘elites’ (Brubaker, 2017, p. 359; Müller, 2016, p. 
20). However, speaking in the name of the people is assumed in modern democracies, 
and not confined to populists. Further disagreements in definition ensue where some 
scholars see populism as an ideology of democracy (Canovan, 2002), while others view 
it as intrinsically anti-democratic, as “a perverse inversion of the ideals and procedures 
of [electoral-representative] democracy” (Rosanvallon, 2008, p. 265). Yet others see its 
effect as enabling democratization processes or contributing to the dismantling of 
democracy, depending on the type of populism and on the political system in which it 
occurs (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, p. 86). This reveals the ambiguity of the 
concept of democracy and its defining notion of ‘the people’ shifting between meanings 
of them as ordinary (plebs), as sovereign (demos), and as culturally or ethnically distinct 
(nation or ethnos). Therefore, ‘the people’, though crucial for democracy, is essentially 
an empty signifier (Laclau, 2007), which comes to represent something different across 
cultural, historical, political and regional contexts. 
Although populism as an analytical concept is contested, we agree with Rogers 
Brubaker (2017, p. 358) that it is indispensable in understanding the current “populist 
moment”. Moreover, many scholars on populism agree that a key feature of populists is 
their claim to be the ‘true democrats’ (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 4) by not only 
 
 
claiming to speak in the name of ‘the people’, but the whole people, following “the idea 
that it’s possible for the people to be one and – all of them – to have one true 
representative” (Müller, 2016, p. 20). Populists combine this with a further claim that 
the current political establishment fails to represent ‘the people’, or more specifically, 
the general will of ‘the people’ (Otjes & Louwerse, 2015, p. 61). Central to the populist 
claim is the notion that ‘the people’ does not equate with the citizenry of a country, but 
refers to an imagined ‘heartland’ of a virtuous, pure and uncorrupted population 
(Taggart, 2000, p. 95). These notions are in line with the definition of populism as a 
‘thin-centred ideology’ (Mudde, 2004, p. 544), which considers society to be separated 
into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’ 
(Mudde 2014; Mudde & Rovira Kalwasser, 2015, p. 18). In understanding populism 
(‘us vs. them’) as ‘thin-centred’, it cannot stand alone, but is always in need of a host 
ideology, which can be either right- or left-wing. 
This minimal definition of populism is consistent with the analytical approaches 
that are applied in the papers included in this special issue. They study populism, for 
example, as a political style (see Löffler) or as discourse generating heterogeneous and 
inconsistent messages (see Wiedlack). They analyse the persona of a populist leader 
(see Starck) or emphasis on how Weber’s notion of charisma contains populist claims to 
being against elites (see Geva). And finally, they problematize the relationship between 
right-wing populism and minority groups (see Lobban et al.).  
Populism and Gender 
There is an extensive literature discussing gender and populism. The following 
overview is not intended to be exhaustive, but to illustrate the research perspectives of 
this still growing field of research. Recent research on populism and gender focuses on 
a wide range of individual, political and social processes including, for example, the 
 
 
representation of women in populist parties (e.g., Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015), 
their performance (e.g. Nocorel, 2018) and leadership (e.g. Meret, Siim & Pingaud, 
2017); on the gender and the psychological characteristics of populist supporters (e.g., 
Coffé, 2018) as well as gendered voting behaviour (e.g. Spierings & Zaslove, 2015; 
2017); on the (anti-feminist) gender ideologies of right-wing populist actors (e.g. 
Korolczuk & Graff, 2018; Kováts, 2018) and their conservative gender (family) policies 
(e.g. Akkerman, 2015). 
With regard to the prominence afforded women in left- and right-wing populist 
parties, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2015) challenge the 
Männerparteien thesis (‘men’s parties’) formulated by Helga Amesberger and Birgit 
Halbmayr (2002). They argue that while right-wing populist parties in Northern Europe 
perform on average worse than other political parties, even if they have a female leader, 
left-wing populist parties in South America seem to be progressive. However, the 
difference relates to the cultural context, a highly emancipated society in Northern 
Europe and strongly patriarchal societies in South America (Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2015, p. 17). Yet the degree to which a party may be considered 
progressive may not necessarily be determined by women’s political prominence 
(Caraventes, 2019; Norocel, 2018). 
The cult of personality around populist leaders contributes to the 
masculinization of politics. The charismatic leader is frequently seen as a feature of 
populism (e.g. Taggart, 2000); though gender neutral, the descriptions of charisma often 
reveal framings that feature predominantly masculine attributes (Meret, 2015, p. 83). 
This leader is usually portrayed as a masculine and potentially violent “strongman”, 
ruling on the basis of “a cult of a leader” (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 63). 
Thus, there is an emphasis on action and the courage to take difficult decisions, which 
 
 
relies on anti- intellectualism and urgency and exemplified by the leader’s virility, the 
use of simple and vulgar language, and, of course, the leader’s charisma (ibid: 64-68). 
As noted above, research has pointed to a gender paradox, namely the existence of 
populist “men’s parties with women leaders” (Meret, Siim & Pingaud, 2017). Female 
populist leaders such as Eva Peron (Argentina), Pia Kjærsgaard (Denmark), Marine 
LePen (France), Sarah Palin (United States) or Alice Weidel (Germany) question the 
taken-for-granted masculine qualities of populist leaders and populism as well as, 
indeed, masculinities themselves.  
Gender research on (Northern and Central) Europe often focuses on the populist 
radical right parties (Akkerman 2015; de Lange & Mügge 2015; Mayer, Ajanovic & 
Sauer, 2018; Spierings et al., 2015) that emerged as a political force since the 1980s 
(Mudde 2004). Populist radical right parties are characterized by their opposition to 
immigration as their most salient and most successfully exploited issue. Consequently, 
they do not only construct an ideological difference between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, 
but also between ‘the people’ as insiders and ‘others’ (outsiders) who pose a threat to 
‘the people’. Since 2001, Islam has been singled out as the main threat.  
Examining the vote for populist radical right parties, a gender gap has been 
observed where more men than women are supportive of them (Harteveld et al. 2015). 
However, the most important reason reported in individuals supporting populist radical 
right parties remains the same for men and women – namely their opposition to 
immigration (Spierings et al., 2015). The gender gap in voting for right-wing populists 
is often overemphasised (Spierings & Zaslove 2015) and reproduces the notion of 
tolerant women vs. intolerant men. Yet we witnessed a large proportion of women 
voting for the 45th President of the United States. Moreover, there have been other 
minority group movements who espouse support for right-wing populists such as “Gays 
 
 
for Trump” and “Alternative Homosexuals” who are part of the German right populist 
AfD (Alternative für Deutschland). 
Populist radical right parties often hold contradictory gender ideological views 
(Akkerman & Hagelund, 2007; Dietze, 2018). They typically emphasize the traditional 
family and gender roles as core institutions of society and oppose same-sex marriage as 
well as abortion. But in debates concerning immigration, in contrast, populist radical 
right parties have adopted more liberal views of gender relations by emphasizing gender 
equality, women’s rights and freedom of choice (Akkerman, 2015, p. 40; Akkerman & 
Hagelund, 2007). This apparent contradiction, between the ‘liberal’ defence of gender 
equality in debates on immigration on the one hand, and the ‘conservative’ defence of 
the traditional family and gender roles on the other, has been explained by discursive 
shifts in populist rhetoric when constructing “others” – “those up there” (the elite) or 
“not us” (Muslim immigrants) (Mayer, Ajanovic & Sauer 2014). Many right-wing 
populists support movements against gender equality, which have been understood as a 
conservative backlash against levels of equality achieved between women and men 
and/or LGBTQ rights (Kováts, 2018, p. 529). Most right-wing populist parties do not 
only support traditional gender norms, but hold essentialist notions of gender as 
determined by sex. They conceive of feminism as a threat to the ‘natural’ division of the 
sexes, and hence, oppose policies that promote gender equality. This is seen, for 
example, in their frequent demand to have gender studies removed from university 
curricula (Küpper, 2018; Mayer, Ajanovic & Sauer, 2018). However, ‘gender’ also 
stands in as a placeholder or empty signifier. As discussed at the European Conference 
of Gender and Politics in 2019,i in Poland and other post-communist European 
countries, gender equality is sometimes framed as ‘communist’ and therefore ‘anti-
democratic’. This perspective fuels the populist claim that gender equality measures are 
 
 
an elitist ideology working against ‘the people’. In right-wing populist discourse ‘the 
people’ is constructed in terms of biological essentialism (Mayer, Sori & Sauer, 2016), 
based on the idea of the traditional conjugal family as the natural cornerstone to society, 
as well as the pre-eminence of men and masculinities in politics (Kreisky, 2014).  
Political Masculinities 
In contrast to the construction of men and masculinity in populist political discourse, we 
suggest elaborating a concept of ‘political masculinities’ that can inform critical gender 
research. In order to facilitate cross-, inter- and multi-disciplinary dialogue, Kathleen 
Starck and Birgit Sauer propose a broad definition of political masculinity, which 
“encompasses any kind of masculinity that is constructed around, ascribed to and/or 
claimed by ‘political players’. These shall be individuals or groups of persons who are 
part of or associated with the ‘political domain’, i.e. professional politicians, party 
members, members of the military as well as citizens and members of political 
movements claiming or gaining political rights” (Stark & Sauer 2014, p. 6). 
This broad definition of political masculinity has served as a foundation for a 
growing body of work, fostering dialogue between a wide range of disciplines, on topics 
as diverse as political masculinities’ involvement with, and associated tensions in, 
prevention of violence against women initiatives in the United Kingdom (Burrell, 
2020); political masculinities in parliamentary debates during Austria’s period of 
postwar nation-building (Löffler, 2019); the Indian state’s intervention, along with the 
role played by both state and non-state political masculinities, in practices of sex 
selection (Rahm, 2019); and the political masculinities of pro-feminist men involved in 
an Israeli high school gender equality intervention programme (Schwartz, 2020). These, 
and other studies, have contributed toward developing the concept of political 
masculinity/ies. A few key observations are useful in this respect. 
 
 
Starck and Luyt (2019) recognise that the original definition particularly speaks 
to masculinities that are more overtly, or easily recognised, as political (e.g., 
professional politician). Yet they stress the importance of including individuals, groups, 
practices or representations of those whose impact on or within the political sphere is 
less easily identified (e.g., citizens, media tycoons, global businessmen/women). This 
allows us to scrutinize the dynamics of interactions between a wide range of ‘political 
players’ and masculinities, an indispensable focus for analysing change in gender 
relations. 
Political masculinities are crucial in the reproduction of power relations. 
However, the concepts of gender and masculinities include dimensions of power. 
Masculinity is therefore always political. While gender and masculinities are 
inextricably political concepts in the production and reproduction of power, it is argued 
that the concept of political masculinities holds particular use in “instances in which 
power is explicitly either being (re)produced or challenged” (Starck & Luyt, 2019, p. 
435). We see the reproduction of power through political masculinities clearly in the 
contributions toward this special issue. For example, Dorit Geva describes how Marine 
Le Pen draws on charisma, as a characteristic of political masculinity that is not in 
conflict with notions of political femininity in France, in order to further her political 
influence; Marion Löffler demonstrates that masculinities exist as a symbolic resource 
that is flexibly drawn upon by political actors in Austria to further their political 
advantage; whilst Kathleen Starck similarly identifies Nigel Farage’s (United Kingdom) 
active construction of his persona to incorporate different representations of masculinity 
in order to appeal to a wide national audience. 
There appears to be consensus in acknowledging political masculinities as 
thoroughly involved in the reproduction of power. Yet the suggestion that we can 
 
 
identify instances in which power is explicitly operating has been the subject of some 
debate (cf. Hearn, 2020; Burrell, 2020). Luyt and Starck (2020) reaffirm their belief in 
the usefulness of considering the extent to which power is operating explicitly through 
masculinities and argue that it is only “[i]n identifying such instances, or through 
actively making the operation of power explicit, (that) possibilities for challenge and 
change are realised” (ibid.). We argue that current phenomena of populism illuminate 
such explicit instances of the production and reproduction of gendered power. The 
contributions to this special issue discuss some examples. Katharina Wiedlack, for 
instance, shows how Putin’s representation and performance of virile and powerful 
masculinity became the object of homophobic ridicule in the ‘liberal’ media discourse 
in the USA, which in turn reaffirms the superiority of heterosexual masculinities. The 
round table discussion of Rose Lobban and her colleagues considers, among other 
things, the obvious power strategies of Donald Trump’s misogynist and homophobic 
rhetoric, and point to his unexpected support by women and LGTBQ+ groups. 
Finally, this special issue on political masculinities and populism aims to 
contribute to the ongoing debate on conceptualizing political masculinities. Luyt and 
Starck (2020) advocate a context-sensitive approach to conceptual definitions which 
avoids privileging dominant modes of understanding and experience (e.g. Western core 
theories). Instead of setting rival definitions (and their underlying world views) against 
each other, they call for an ‘inquisitorial’ or questioning approach, in which “the value 
of a concept and its definition is determined by the extent to which it can meaningfully 
elucidate our understanding of local contexts” (ibid.). The papers included in this 
special issue explore how varying incarnations of political masculinities across different 
contexts operate to either reproduce or challenge existing power relations and gender 
inequality. They generate new insights into the meaning of political masculinities when 
 
 
considering (right-wing) populism and contribute to the debate on the gender 
dimensions of populism. 
Contributions 
Marion Löffler conceptualizes political masculinities with reference to Raewyn 
Connell’s notion of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of ‘symbolic 
violence’. She explores how in the 2017 general election right-wing and centrist 
Austrian populist leaders have shifted the nature of their gender performance in light of 
a changed political landscape. In their striving for electoral success they have, on the 
one hand, adopted strongly populist, even marketing, gender strategies in their 
campaigns. Yet they have also employed a “division of labour” by allocating different 
political masculinities to different actors of the same party, thus maximising their 
chances to get elected. 
Dorit Geva examines, through extensive field research, the notion of charisma 
for the Front National’s leader Marine Le Pen from 2013-2017. She argues that gender 
relations are an integral structure of populism and for this purpose introduces Mimi 
Schipper’s concept of ‘hegemonic gender’, arguing that gender hegemony is the basis of 
modern charisma. Geva demonstrates how Le Pen’s political success rests on her 
employment of both ‘hegemonic masculinity’ as well as ‘hegemonic femininity’. 
In a line of argument, not unlike Löffler’s, Kathleen Starck analyses former 
UKIP and now Brexit Party leader Nigel Farage’s flexible gender performance as a 
populist leader by conducting a close reading of his two autobiographies. She argues 
that Farage effectively constructs his persona of the city gent by blending his Everyman 
performance with a ‘city masculinity’ to construct a charismatic strongman persona and 
a ‘gentleman masculinity’ in order to appeal to English nationalist voters, enabling 
Farage to cater to different audiences. 
 
 
Katharina Wiedlack reviews the contradictory US mass media discourse around 
Russian President Putin’s political masculinity. She exposes how the ridicule of, and 
fearmongering around the strongman performance of Putin in the Russian media, are 
used by American media to propagate US-superiority and activate fears of the Russian 
nation. Yet Wiedlack argues that they simultaneously stabilize patriarchal 
heteronormative able-bodiedness and thereby the notion that president Putin is a strong 
and able leader. Thus, she demonstrates how even diametrically opposed discourses of 
political masculinity can produce the same result – that is to say, reinscribing the notion 
of a charismatic strongman. 
Finally, Rosemary Lobban, Russell Luyt, Sam Martin Ashley Brooks, Daragh 
McDermott and Magdalena Zawisza-Riley, drawing on a recent panel discussion, 
examine the seeming conflict surrounding support for right-wing populists by 
marginalised or disadvantaged groups such as LGBTQ+ and women. Focusing on 
different social psychological perspectives, they argue that disadvantaged or minority 
supporters of right-wing populism often react to a threat to the self and can find ‘safe’ 
identities in right-wing populism – for example, economically, personally, physically, 
psychologically or socially motivated. Moreover, their support for right-wing populism 
can be motivated by a rejection of victimhood. Both safe identities as well as rejecting 
victimhood symbolically offer access to power. 
The research conducted in these contributions refers to a range of democracies 
with different experiences with, and tradition of, right-wing populism. Austria (Löffler) 
and France (Geva), for instance, have a long history of radical right-populist parties 
(The Austrian Freedom Party and the French National Front), while populism is a 
rather novel phenomenon in the United Kingdom (Starck), Australia (Martin) and 
Ireland (McDermott). The United States (Wiedlack, Brooks, Luyt, Zawisza-Riley), 
 
 
alternatively, have a longstanding tradition of (liberal) populism and at the same time 
experience a novel phenomenon of right-wing populism. Each of these populisms (in 
plural) deploy and challenge the conventional gender order. Following this line of 
argument, all contributions to this special issue do not only attest to the diverse 
configurations of populist political masculinities, but also to political actors’ versatile 
strategic employment of different repertoires of political masculinities for different 
purposes. Moreover, they illuminate the mutual relations between those populist 
‘political players’ who occupy the centre of the political sphere, and those who are 
relatively peripheral. Finally, the findings of these articles suggest that populist political 
masculinities do not simply equate with ‘hegemonic masculinity’, rather they might 
challenge hegemony or indicate crisis tendencies of the gender order. Identifying what 
exactly the nature of the relationship between hegemonic and political masculinities is, 
however, remains the task of future research. 
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